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Decentralised Atomic Information Disclosure with Onion Rings (Poster)

Decentralised Atomic Information Disclosure with Onion Rings (Poster)
Autor:

Stengele, Oliver

Links:
Quelle:

Financial Cryptography and Data Security 2018, Curaçao, March 2018

Datum: 2018-02-26

We define the atomic information disclosure problem which tasks an arbitrary
number of parties to release an individually held piece of information iff all of the
parties release their information. This is similar to the “common hand” variant of
Liar’s Dice 1 where the previously private dice rolls of each player have to become
public in order to determine the outcome of each round. This problem also arises
in open ballot voting where partial results are undesirable and timing-based
advantages and disadvantages should be eliminated.
To achieve the desired atomicity, the privilege of disclosure must be delegated,
otherwise parties could refuse to participate after learning the information of some
or all other parties. In order to avoid a single point of failure and to separate the
privilege of disclosure from read access, a decentralised approach is imperative.
We present the concept of Onion Rings which uses asymmetric encryption to
construct multilayered lockboxes containing the private keys necessary for disclo-
sure in a circular manner. Using an Onion Ring, a large number of participants
can delegate the privilege of disclosure to a comparatively small group in such a
way that the members of the ring cannot peek into the encrypted submissions
whose disclosure they oversee, unless they collude. While threshold encryption
schemes can be used to construct a similar procedure, they tend to be difficult
to deploy on current blockchains or prohibitively expensive to execute.
The circular structure gives rise to a quasi-threshold property where only a
subset of involved parties need to agree on the release of their keys in order to
cause the disclosure of all submissions. While it is unavoidable that any party
in the ring holding the last private key necessary for disclosure can peek before
releasing their key, the circular construction ensures that this advantageous
position is held by at least two parties of which only one needs to cooperate in
order to finalise the procedure.
Both the number of participants and the number of lockbox layers are ad-
justable parameters that immediately affect the security of the scheme with
regard to both ensuring disclosure and preventing unwanted outcomes.
Lastly, it should be noted that game theory and economic incentive schemes
seem to be well suited to facilitate the proper execution of this scheme and to
discourage unwanted behaviour. A blockchain can serve as both the enforcement
and rewarding mechanism as well as a public, persistent, tamper-evident, and
non-repudiative communication channel.